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Hotshots
THE ORIGINS AND WORK CULTURE OF AMERICA'S ELITE WILDLAND
FIREFIGHTERS

Lincoln Bramwell

O

n a hot, dry day in early July 1994 near Glenwood Springs, Colorado,
high winds fanned a small fire on the top of Storm King Mountain

into a major conflagration that quickly blew over fifty-two of the U.S. Forest
Service's most elite firefighters as they battled the flames. Fourteen men and
women died, including nine members of the Prineville (Oregon) Hotshots.
This tragedy brought national attention to Interagency Hotshot Crews (IHC),
the backbone of the federal government's response to wildland fire. IHCs,
twenty-person rapid-response fire crews, specialize in large, dangerous wildfires. Their high level of physical fitness, training, self-reliance, and expertise make the IHC the Forest Service's elite firefighters; these men and
women are dispatched to the worst fires in the toughest terrain under the
most life-threatening circumstances.
Despite the increasing regularity and severity of wildfires each summer
in the American West, along with extensive news coverage, wildland
firefighters' culture has received relatively little study. Most historians focus
on national fire-management policies and strategies, while overlooking the
firefighters deployed 0,0 the ground. The history of hotshot firefighters and
their implementation of federal policies is essentially a history of humans'
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relationship with the land. In the past, humans maintained a more ambiguous, complex, and mysterious relationship with fire than with any of the
other natural elements. Before European settlement, Native Americans
burned forests, savannahs, and grasslands across the North American continent to improve hunting, manage crops, increase yields of wild plants, manage pests, send signals, and fight wars. 1 By the twentieth century, however,
fire was an unacceptable threat to economic resources and private property.
The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) developed hotshot crews specifically to
fight fires in the rugged West. The history of the creation and maturation of
the IHC program paralleled the federal government's aggressive policy toward combating western wildland fire. A decision in 1935 required that,
once a fire was reported, the conflagration had to be under control by the
next morning, and this mandate became national policy for the next forty
years. The Forest Service designated hotshot crews to carry out the policy.
To do this, hotshots separated themselves from other firefighters and developed their own workplace culture that reflected the nature of their dangerous assignments.
Hotshots institutionalized a tough, professional, masculine culture to
help them execute their jobs. During the twentieth century, this culture
confronted changes in federal fire-management policy, technical and tactical developments, and especially the incorporation of women as firefighters.
These elements have often generated tensions for the IHC's static gung-ho
culture-a way of life appropriate more in the military than in an institution where personal safety is a primary concern. Over time, however, the
work culture and ethos developed by hotshots precipitated disasters when
overconfidence led crews into dangerous situations that cost them their lives.
In a very real sense the work culture became its own policy, with tragic
consequences for the hotshots. The intention of this article is to describe
and interpret the hotshot work ethos as well as chronicle its origins, referring to specific fire events that best represent their culture.
Ruth Benedict articulated the definition of work culture that frames this
article in Patterns ofCulture (1934). Work culture is a "dynamic process that
is constantly shaped by technical and social factors and, as such, it is variously interpreted by those individuals who come in contact with and borrow from it."2 A body of customs form much of this work culture. Defined in
their broadest sense by Benedict, customs are "the patterns and standards
traditionally handed down in a community."3 In the workplace, they range
from mundane tasks to complex rites of passage, but together they contrib-
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ute equally to the work culture. Dress, work habits and standards, attitudes
toward other firefighters, and masculine self-identity are among the primary
customs that define hotshot work culture. 4
Public and congressional support for fire suppression intensified after
devastating Idaho fires claimed seventy-eight lives in 1910.5 The Weeks Act
of 1911 legislated permanent emergency firefighting funds to make aggressive wildland-fire suppression a priority. In the decade following the deadly
Idaho fires, the Forest Service experimented with various firefighting strategies. Newly designated USFS chief Henry S. Graves commented on the
importance of using trained, organized crews to protect forests from destructive blazes. In a Forest Service bulletin from 1910, he wrote: "The following are of 1st importance: 1) Quick arrival at the fire; 2) an adequate
force; 3) proper equipment; 4) a thorough organization of the fighting crew;
and 5) skill in attacking and fighting fires."6
After twenty-five years offledgling firefighting efforts by the agency, USFS
chief Ferdinand Silcox issued a national wildland-fire directive in 1935.
Known as the "10 AM Policy," the mandate attempted to standardize the
response to wildfire. The policy ordered firefighters to control a fire by ten
0' clock the morning after its first report, making aggressive fire suppression
the standard response. Suppressing fires by ten o'clock in the morning was
also viewed as cost effective because managing a number of small fires,
instead of containing one large conflagration, was far less expensive. 7
For many years, USFS fire wardens and management officers desired
better-organized fire crews. 8 During the 1930S, the restriction on using Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) enrollees to fight fires led to experiments
toward creating economically efficient firefighting crews in 1939. L. L. Colviii, assistant forest supervisor in the Siskiyou National Forest in Oregon,
spent much of the previous summer battling the largest fires in the Pacific
Northwest. He found that poorly conditioned, trained, and supervised fire
crews simply took too long to reach a fire, were too worn out from the hike
to fight fires effectively, and needed considerable support to live away from
their base for several days. Colvill recognized the need for "trained crews of
physically [sic] supermen capable of sustaining themselves on the fire line
for periods of several days with a minimum of [support] ."9 Intrigued by his
suggestion, the Forest Service ordered the Siskiyou National Forest supervisor to organize a forty-man crew of "supermen" to test the idea.
Nearly all future hotshot protocol and routine came from the Siskiyou
experiment. First, the supervisors chose a junior forester with ten years of
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fire experience to lead the new crew, basing applicants' selection on their
"physical prowess, woodsmanship, and self-motivation." Operating on the
"every private a captain" principle, the supervisors wanted experienced personnel able to make decisions during critical situations.IOTwo recent hotshot
superintendents, Paul Linse and Larry Edwards, wrote of the experiment's
guiding principles: "Professionalism, through organization, training, and
experience incorporated not only safety, but a commitment to excellence,
technical expertise, strong esprit d'corps, and a no excuses 'can-do attitude. mIl
A forester colorfully described the crews as "compact gangs of smoke-eating
hellions in which every last man is a triple-threat to any fire."12 In addition to
having experience, potential hotshot candidates had to be males between
the ages oftwenty-one and forty. The Forest Service held to a de facto policy
that excluded women from working as firefighters, except as fire lookouts.
Typically, the job drew unmarried foresters, a pattern that is still evident
today, because their responsibilities required extended time away from the
duty station. In addition to appealing to single foresters, the Siskiyou experiment attracted rural men comfortable with physical labor in the outdoorsY
To tackle fires in the inaccessible backcountry, an area where logistical
support was difficult to arrange, each man carried enough provisions to
support himself for three days. The supervisors from Siskiyou estimated the
caloric intake for each man at three calories per pound per hour. Thus, a
I80-pound man working sixteen-hour days for three days required an extraordinary 25,920 calories. For a crew that expected to work at unprecedented
speeds to stop the first run of a fire, the high calories were essential to their
high performances. One forester described the crew's job: "It is man-killing
work too, for the pace set is terrific and no woodsman likes to show or to
admit fatigue."14 The forty-man crew experiment at Siskiyou National Forest was a resounding success.!'
America's entry into World War II diminished the Forest Service's manpower, thus necessitating a reliance on forty-man crews. During the war,
women entered the firelines for the first time, replacing large numbers of
men drafted into military service. Like most wartime occupations, women
were laid off after the war to make way for returning servicemen. Women
did not return to the fireline for nearly twenty years. 16
Following World War II, the USFS routinely pressed nonspecialist employees into fire crews known as "regulars" for local fires, but relied on
mobile, flexible, and well-organized crews to achieve control of fires by ten
0' clock in the morning. After the war ended and the Forest Service perma-
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nently lost the manpower and large budgets from New Deal programs like
the CCC, experiments began to reduce the forty-man crew's size and cost.
Near the Siskiyou, the Willamette National Forest developed a twenty-man
crew. When calls came, the firefighters gathered at prearranged points before traveling to the fire. Dubbed the "Willamette Flying 20," the supervisors organized the crew with one foreman and two squad bosses as overhead
management, a pattern generations of hotshot crews subsequently adopted. 17
By 1947, following the examples of the Oregon Red Hats and the
Willamette Flying 20, twenty-man crews appeared in the chaparral-covered
national forests of Southern California. Based in the San Bernardino, Cleveland, Angeles, and Los Padres national forests, the Southern California crews
first used the title hotshot. 18 The new title reflected the mobile crews' speed
and their fearlessness as they shot into the hottest parts of the fire. The label
also revealed the self-confident image the crews wanted to project as they
established themselves as the most effective option to fighting large western
fires. Streamlining as much as possible to decrease their response time to
fires, these Southern California crews had shrunk in size but increased their
effectiveness.
Many observers of hotshot crews explain the attraction to the job in terms
of the potential paycheck. Although a small motivator for crewmembers,
money alone cannot explain why young individuals compete for a job that
requires extensive travel and time away from home, back-breaking labor on
a daily basis, and the mental and emotional strain of working in a dangerous and unpredictable occupation. "Just being here because it's good money
or a good summer job is not enough to get you through a season. It's too
tough," remembered a former Lolo (Montana) Hotshot.
To be part of an elite community of firefighters and the desire for adventure and new challenges are motivating factors as prominent as a paycheck
for joining hotshot crews. 19 Taken as a whole, the physical challenge of the
job, the sense of community, and the potential to make quick money attracted young people. Some applicants were college students and athletes,
others were ex-military personnel, but all shared a passion for hard work in
the outdoors that defined hotshot work culture. Supervisors and foremen
who remained with these crews for any length of time typically accrued
daily aches and pains from numerous work-related injuries,zo Fighting fires
on an elite, mobile fire crew translated into high adventure and long periods away from home. These absences significantly contributed to their distinctive work culture, strong sense of community, and "in-group" identity.ZI

THE LOS PADRES (CALIFORNIA) HOTSHOTS HIKE TO THE FIRELINE

(Photograph courtesy Mike McMillan, www.spotfireimages.com)

1995 SAWTOOTH HOTSHOTS AT GALENA
(Photograph courtesy S. Don Garrett)
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The Sawtooth Hotshots' recruitment flyer reflects the IHC's high morale and can-do attitude: "We endure discomforts with a smile and a proud
proclamation that we would gladly do it all again."22 Tough training and
confidence helped when conditions grew worse. Hotshots took pride in being the only crews on a fire capable-or foolish-enough to accomplish
the most dangerous assignments. The Los Prietos (California) Hotshots borrowed their unofficial motto from the Marines: "The difficult we do immediately, the impossible takes a little longer."23
As hotshot crews established their work culture, the development of
mechanized fire equipment altered the IHC structure. The original fortyman c;rews needed eleven to eighteen men to fell trees and clear smaller
vegetation. By the 195os, lighter power chainsaws required only six men to
accomplish an equal or greater amount of work. 24 Also, the helicopter increased hotshot crew mobility by rapidly delivering them to critical fire areas. A fire conference in Ogden, Utah, in 1950 was so impressed by the use
of helicopters that it recommended "aerial shock troops" be stationed at

A SAW TEAM CAREFULLY WORKS ITS WAY AROUND A BURNING TREE

(Photograph courtesy S. Don Garrett)
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critical locations throughout the nation. Despite recent advances in weather
prediction and observation, firefighting technology has not changed since
the introduction of the helicopter and chainsaw. Federal agencies still expect firefighters wielding simple hand tools to stop a fire's advance.25
In 1961 the Forest Service established five Interregional Fire Suppression Crews (IR) based on the idea proposed by the Ogden conference. 26
The delay to place aerial shock troops at strategic locations was due in large
part to the size of the agency's bureaucracy and the time needed to adjust
policy. Modeled on the half dozen hotshot crews operating in California in
the 1950S, IR crews consisted of close to twenty members. IR crews' size,
structure, and mobility place them in the same lineage as today's hotshot
crews. Beginning each June, an IR crew would remain on call twenty-four
hours a day, seven days a week. When they were off duty, sign-out sheets
informed supervisors of the whereabouts of crewmembers in case of a fire
call. The IR crews were advantageous because they could reach any location in the West within six to eight hours and arrived as a complete package: supervisors, crew, tools, radios, bedding, and enough fbod for forty-eight
hours. 27 The Forest Service coordinated all requests for IR crews from the
National Fire Control Center in Washington, D.C. By 1963 the number
of IR crews doubled to ten, and they rapidly grew, but within a decade
hotshot crews absorbed the IR crew program and adopted its aerial mobile capabilities. 28
A key ingredient to IHC success was pride. The hotshots proudly separated themselves from "regular" fire crews and displayed the distinctive shoulder patch. 29 The El Cariso (California) Hotshots wore berets during the
196os, emulating U.S. Army Special Forces serving in Vietnam. By this time
hotshot crews adopted orange flame-retardant shirts, hard hats, blue jeans,
and a pair of White's logging boots - a hand-stitched, cowboy-heel boot that
could cost a month's salary-as their own standard fireline attire. 3D Clothing
was (and is) a particularly meaningful sign for this group. The unique clothing and accoutrements bond hotshots together and distinguish them from
other groups on a fire.
The IHC program enjoyed success in the field and acceptance from
federal fire officials by the 1970S' Faced with the dual challenges of a shrinking budget during an economic recession and of maintaining mechanized
equipment and aircraft costs as fuel prices sharply rose, the USFS searched
for ways to save money.31 The hotshot program received praise for its costefficient performance. Fire-management officers pointed out that, in any
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HOTSHOTS IN THEIR ELEMENT, DIGGING FIRE LINE

(Photograph courtesy Mike McMillan, www.spotfireimages.com)
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given fire, hotshot crews dug 50 percent more fireline than regular Forest
Service crews. 32 Jerry Ewart, fire officer for the Tonto National Forest in
Arizona, explained that three hotshot crews on his forest saved millions of
dollars in projected suppression costs and resource losses. 33
By the end of the 1970S, forest-ecology and wildlife research, along with
congressional legislation and new fire-management techniques, altered federal fire policy. The Wilderness Act of 1964 declared areas within public
lands offlimits to mechanized fire suppression equipment. In addition some
fire managers recognized that fire equipment such as bulldozers sometimes
damaged more land than they protected. New research on forest ecology,
particularly in relation to wilderness areas, began to suggest that fire played
a beneficial role in maintaining the health of the forest ecosystem. Concurrent with this idea, prescribed burning (the controlled application of fire to
the ecosystem) gained wide acceptance among policymakers, bureaucrats,
and field personnel as an effective tool to increase forest health and prevent
large conflagrations. 34
All these factors led to the reassessment of the 10 AM Policy at the National Fire Planning Meeting in Denver in July 1977. The new National
Forest Manual rejected the old policy's implicit assumption that all fires
were bad, although it still mandated an aggressive initial attack on fires. If
initial attack failed, the incident commander had other alternatives, such as
allowing naturally caused fires to run their course or initiating a cost-benefit
analysis before extending suppression efforts. Hotshots had little to do with
the 10 AM Policy's modification, and despite the change in policy, the hotshots'
job on the ground remained the same. With an institutionalized culture,
they went on aggressively fighting fires and putting themselves at risk to
protect property and their reputations. 35
Meanwhile, developers built more homes along the edges of towns, in
forests, and grasslands, and larger numbers of people sought enjoyment
through outdoor recreation, which increasingly put additional lives and
property at risk from wildland fires. 36 In one policy review, the Forest Service warned: "More and more people are moving away from the city and
away from things they generally take for granted, like fire protection. A house
or a group of houses in an otherwise undeveloped area can turn a routine
fire into a nightmare for firefighters and homeowners."37 As an "ex-urban"
population reclaimed the rural landscape, the need for hotshot crews that
could handle the technical challenge of urban-interface fire escalated. Author John N. Maclean estimated that the "astonishing rates" of ex-urban
settlement made "an already dangerous situation explosive."38
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The hotshots accepted the increased suppression burden. By 1982 there
were fifty-four hotshot crews nationwide. J9 The Department ofInterior started
its own hotshot crews among its subordinate agencies. After the Park Service organized the Arrowhead, Alpine, and Buffalo hotshot crews, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and Bureau of Indian Affairs likewise
fielded hotshot crews in the 1980s.
Like competitive private businesses, hotshot crews strove to provide the
most comprehensive and efficient service. This competitiveness contributed to the discipline, toughness, and cocksure swagger that accompanied
hotshot crews from the fireline to the fire camp. Crew recruitment flyers in
the 1990S combined an invitation, a warning, and a dare. The Sawtooth
IHC advertised:
[Llooking for a very few good people. The work is guaranteed to be
difficult, exhausting physical labor, day in, day out. We'll hike the
farthest and stay the longest. We endure discomforts with a smile and a
proud proclamation that we would gladly do it all again. We love the
dirt, the sun, the rain, the heat, the cold, bad food and big flame.
There are no obstacles, only opportunities for adventure and
solutions. 40
Their competitive nahne and pursuit of excellence translate into increased
performance on fires. When they fight fires, more is expected from hotshot
crews than from any other firefighters. They are counted on by fire managers to tackle the difficult assignments without complaint. In the end, they
produce more fireline than do regular crews because hotshots are physically tougher and work better as a team. The Fireline Handbook, a pocketsize
federal reference guide carried by all fire crews, provides tables that help
fire managers predict how much work they can expect from fire crews. The
manual states that Type I (hotshot) crews produce 50 to 100 percent more
fireline than nonelite, or Type II, fire crews, depending on terrain and vegetation. Type II crews form the broad base of the wildfire manpower pyramid. Nonfire specialists, Type II fire crews are made up of regular Forest
Service employees not normally assigned to fight fires. Varying greatly in
their physical capabilities, they often consist of nonfield personnel who require breaks every hour or two or sometimes are sent home because they
cannot physically handle the work. Since physical endurance is expected of
hotshot crews, they need less than an hour for meal and rest breaks during
a normal sixteen-hour shift. 4!
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SAWTOOTH .HOTSHOTS TAKE A BREAK ON THE FIRELINE

Left to right: Brad Sawyer, Dave Vining, Kevin Raymond, and Brent
Sawyer.
(Photograph courtesy S. Don Garrett)

Hotshots achieve their physical-fitness level and group cohesion in prefire
season training. Hotshots condition like athletes through strength training
and cardiovascular exercises during the winter off-season. Each hotshot crew
completes at least eighty hours of training as a group before reporting to
fight fires. The training includes physical fitness tests as well as classroom
and field instruction in firefighting. National standards require potential
hotshots to perform at a specific level. Each crew tends to establish much
higher physical standards for themselves. For example in 1997 the Sawtooth
Hotshots from Twin Falls, Idaho, tested their crew the first day they reported
to work that summer. Before they arrived, the superintendent declared that
anyone who did not meet the crew's expectations would be asked to leave.
In consecutive tests with little rest in between, the crew averaged eight minutes, forty-five seconds for the mile-and-a-half run; sixty-three sit-ups per
minute; sixty-two push-ups per minute; thirteen pull-ups; and they finished
a three-mile stress hike with a one-thousand foot elevation gain carrying a
fifty-pound backpack in under forty-five minutes. These averages represented
normal standards. Positions on hotshot crews are extremely hard to attain.
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That same year, the Sawtooth Hotshots received twelve hundred applications for only eight openings. 42
Extremely hard workouts were the norm for many crews. Dennis Pratt,
the foreman and later superintendent of the Sawtooth Hotshots, was instrumental in building and maintaining one of the most highly respected IHC
crews in the country. He demanded a high level of physical fitness and
discipline. Former crewmembers recalled how Pratt led them on grueling
runs in excess of an hour through the Sawtooth National Forest, yelling at
the top of his lungs, "Fat firefighters die!" Zealous workouts were by no
means confined to one crew. In an incident in 1996, a member of the Globe
Hotshots, from the Tonto National Forest in Arizona, died from heat exhaustion during a training run before the fire season started. This extreme
example illustrates how, even before the fire season arrives, hotshot crews
push their physical capacity to the breaking pointY
Characterized as the endurance runners of the firefighting world, hotshot
crews often work away from their duty stations for over a month at a time.
The Alpine Hotshots' website matter-of-factly states: "During the [fire] season, it's not uncommon to work shifts lasting over 24 hours, with some possible [sic] surpassing 40 hours. Our willingness to stay until the job is done
is a trademark of the Hotshots." One of California's Stanislaus Hotshots
remembered the long shifts: "We'd had a 17 day run, averaging 18-19 hour
days. It was really the perfect scenario-a new fire every day or so. The
crews were having a good time (except that for the entire 17 day run there
were no showers)." Before changes in policy in 2000, hotshots typically
worked twenty-one days straight and then were relieved for two days. Often
they repeated the cycle and returned to the fireline for another twenty-one
days. Hotshots measured a fire season's success by the amount of accumulated overtime. For example a "good" season for the Logan Hotshots based
in Utah exceeded one thousand hours of overtime earned in just over four
months. 44 In contrast a regular fire crew of Forest Service employees rarely
works a full twenty-one-day assignment before being disbanded, with crew
members taking several more days off before returning to their normal jobs. 45
In comparison to other wildland fire crews, hotshots work as a well-oiled
machine. Each member of a hotshot crew intimately knows his own and
everyone else's job on the fireline, an ethic that allows everyone to work
more efficiently. In contrast regular crews have a wide range of experience,
and most members have not worked together prior to a fire assignment. The
appearance of nonelite crews that are pieced together from seasonal em-
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ployees working on trail crews, as wilderness rangers or numerous' other
summer assignments, is often rag-tag when compared to the hotshots. Usually, a regular twenty-person crew has six people who have never fought a
fire and six more who have not fought one in years. The federal government
mandates that over 80 percent of the members in a hotshot crew must have
prior fire experience. Fire manager Stanley Stevenson explained, "The value
of a trained unit of men that can be sent into difficult sections of a fire
perimeter with a high degree of certainty that control will be effected, has
been demonstrated many times."46
This certainty is partially achieved through the cultivation of discipline,
a hallmark trait of hotshot crews. Supervisors drill military-like obedience
into hotshots during their preseason training and reinforce it everyday on
the fireline. Many crews enforce monetary fines for crewmembers who fail
to follow an assignment or break a crew rule. Such discipline ensures order
and control in stressful, dangerous fire situations. Consequently, dangerous
assignments-like starting back burns or leading direct attacks on the head
of fires - that require critical decision-making skills and group cohesion are
usually delegated to hotshot crews.
Far from trivial, the appearance of a hotshot crew creates a visual hierarchy among firefighters. Hotshots stand out from regular or nonelite fire
crews in every way. Since the 1950S, heads have turned in fire camps when
hotshots arrive on fires in their own specially designed, all-terrain vehicles,
nicknamed "crummies," with the crew's name, insignia, and federal agency
emblazoned on all sides. Their unique uniforms also distinguish hotshots.
Everyone is required to wear matching crew t-shirts and hats on the fireline
.and in camp. Each piece of clothing and gear, from backpacks to sleeping
bags to helmets, is exactly the same for every member of a hotshot crew.
Finally, the fact that hotshot crews are physically bigger and in better shape
than the vast majority of fire crews creates a commanding impressionY
Hotshot work culture is reflected in the crews on the trail and in fire
camp through their military-like discipline and attitude of superiority. Arrowhead Hotshot superintendent Brit Rosso declared, "Being a hotshot is
more that just a T-shirt and a fancy crew truck."48 After recently spending
time in the field with a hotshot crew, journalist Douglas Gantenbein noted:
[They] build their esprit around their ability to work fiendishly hard for
days on end and endure summers spent within a few feet of their
teammates, either in camp, in the chow line, or on the fireline.

HOTSHOT CREW MARCHING SINGLE FILE

At the end of a work shift, the hotshot crew returns from the fireline in their characteristic style.
(Photograph courtesy S. Don Garrett)
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Hotshot crews can be spotted from miles away - most fire crews hike in
sort of scattershot fashion along a trail. Hotshots don't hike anywhere.
They march, neatly spaced three feet apart, maintaining a steady pace
of about two miles an hour whether on flat land, hiking up a steep
hillside, or descending a rocky slope. 49
Similar to the military, no one is allowed to wander around eccentrically or
aimlessly. Each person subordinates himself to the will of the crew. A former
California hotshot wrote about this distinction on the fireline: "Almost forty
firefighters are standing helplessly by as the fire burns further into the sage.
. . . Without even a word our twenty-man crew marches right through their
midst and out into the path of the flames."5o
While discipline is very noticeable, a hotshot's attitude of superiority is
no less obvious. In fire camps, hotshots separate themselves from other
firefighters. They do not socialize with other crews or camp personnel. They
are there to work, and their focus shows in their dirty and fatigued appearance. 51 Often hotshots refer to other firefighters in derogatory terms. Donut

eaters is a common name given to any firefighter, especially fire managers
who are not on the fireline. They apply the term engine slugs to engine
crews; even other elite firefighters are referred to derisively. Hell-a-slack refers to helitack crews that operate helicopters, and they mock smokejumpers
as dirt darts for their hard landings and rock stars for the media attention
they garnerY
The hotshots heap disdain and contempt on others, but they still garner
a great deal of respect from those same firefighters. Longtime hotshot superintendent Paul Gleason explained the dynamic: "You get these situations where the fire blows up and it's making a big run and it's chewing
through the forest and all the regular firefighters have been pulled back.
And they're standing alongside the road when we go by. And you hear them
say, 'Here come the hotshots. They're gonna take care of it. Throw them in
the middle of it. They'll pick it up.m 53 Former hotshot and author John
Buckley recalled one of his crewmates expounding: "We had to run all the
way down the hill to save the fire for two crews that get paid the same money
we do. Why? Cause we're hotshots. It's not just that we've got more experience and more training ... a lot of it is just a matter of pride. It may not pay
the bills, but no matter where we go, we know we're the best."54 Contrary to
this braggadocio, Gleason warned: "You have to be careful not to let that
stuff get into you too much. You've got to work on the edge. But when you
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get close, you've got to know what close is." Gleason's comments would
prove prophetic at the intersection between hotshot work culture and disaster fires. 55
Beginning in the late 1970s, several elements of the hotshots' work cul- .
ture began to change. One issue addressed was sexual discrimination against
women entering the firefighting crews. No one knows for sure when the
first woman joined a hotshot crew, but it was after the passage of Executive
Order 11246, better known as Affirmative Action. The first women faced a
daunting challenge. Hotshots, who had been exclusively male until the 1970S,
defined themselves against all other cohorts including women. To the degree that gender is constructed in a relationship between male and female,
most of the early descriptions of the crews used male or masculine language: they were "physical supermen," and "smoke-eating hellions," and
the work was "man-killing" because "no woodsman likes to show or admit
fatigue."56 Through effective fire control, IHC firefighters demonstrated and
established presumptions about the power of male bodies. 57 Male hotshots
unsurprisingly denigrated other male firefighters with gibes like "pussy, pansy,
and little girl." Superintendent Scott Bushman remembered a time when
hotshot crews marched like military units into fire camp to the tune of vulgar, sexist cadence songs. 58 Therefore, male crewmembers juxtaposed their
masculinity against notions of femininity.
Former hotshot Lael Gorman recalled: "Back then, I knew I was in a job
that was basically a man's world. I told myself that I had chosen to be there,
so I accepted a lot. ... I accepted things in that time that no woman would
accept now and that most men would find objectionable."59 This statement
characterized the hotshots' domain when the first women broke into their
ranks in the late 1970S. Cheryl Surface-Wilcock remembered entering the
Silver State Hotshots' ready room in Carson City, Nevada, in 1977 to find
the walls plastered with Playboy centerfolds. Besides overcoming the physical barriers, female hotshots had to endure the scrutiny, sexism, and chauvinism of a formerly all-male crew. In fire camps, the first women tolerated
whistles, stares, and obscenities.
These path-breaking women experienced a combination of acceptance
and resistance. The latter most often came from the older generation of
firefighters and managers. In the early 1970s, Carl Hickerson, head ofUSFS
fire operations for the Pacific Northwest region, repeated a speech to senior
fire officials titled "Should Firefighters Wear Petticoats?" His argument, that
women lacked the emotional stability to make critical decisions and dimin-
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ished the stature of firefighters, was enthusiastically received. Hickerson
declared, "I simply cannot imagine a truly feminine woman even considering fire suppression work, and all the adversity, filth, and hazard it entails."6o
Often the public's introduction to female hotshots was skeptical as well.
Surface-Wilcock recalled washing offsoot from a fire in a restaurant's women's
bathroom to the horror of other female patrons. One incredulously asked,
"You mean they let girls fight fire?" Her fellow female hotshot chimed in,
"No ma'am, we just make sandwiches and sweep rocks." Satisfied, the patrons returned to their meals. 61
As more woruen broke down the all-male world of wildland firefighting,
they won the begrudging respect of their peers. The former Zig Zag (Oregon) Hotshots' superintendent remembered this change:
When 1 was an eighteen-year-old stud, 1 used to sit around and laugh
about the idea of women being on fire crews.... The idea was
hilarious. But then 1 started getting women on my crew. It really came
home to me how much wildland fire is an endurance game .... The
women kept going, all day, all night, it doesn't matter, on just a little
bit of food and no rest. ... One year 1 had seven women on my
hotshot crew.... 1 felt there was absolutely no loss in crew
performance by having that many women. 62
The main criterion for acceptance into the hotshot work culture was performance on the ground. The first women were under tremendous pressure to
meet the same physical standards as men. As more and more performed to
hotshot standards, their numbers on the crews increased. The tough, aggressive training standards were never lowered for women. Sue Husari explains: "I broke in on the Lassen [California] Hotshots under a guy who was
a typical, traditional 'shot boss. He yelled and screamed and made us work
hard. But he was an equal-opportunity abuser. He treated us all like dirt.
Even when 1 was furious at him, 1 appreciated him."63
Recent generations of female hotshots have encountered fewer problems
of acceptance than their predecessors did. Women today claim their positions on the crews without any deference to traditionally submissive gender
roles. However, they struggle against their own set of gender biases on a
daily basis, and male crew members tend to demonstrate benevolent paternalism. Michael Thoele writes, "It manifests itself most often in either bigbrother protectiveness, or in the assumption that some task is too heavy, too
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dangerous, or too complex for a woman." A male member of the Prineville
(Oregon) Hotshots explains:
I've also noticed that at the start of the season, the guys will pay special
attention to the new girls on the crew. You notice that one's really
pretty and one's really sweet. That changes in about a month, after
you've all been out and gotten dirty and tired on a fire. After that, she's
your sister, and anybody who messes with her is in trouble. And that's
not always something the women appreciate. They don't always want
someone looking out for them. 64
Or, as one female who broke the early gender barrier declared, "Nothing
will make a group of male firefighters move faster than a woman reaching
to pick up a chainsaw."65
Female hotshots incorporated the traditional hotshot ethos into their own
identities. No allowances were made in the tight quarters and close working
conditions of hotshot crews. Living out of a crew vehicle for weeks on end,
female hotshots were spared none of the sights and smells of everyone else's
bodies. Still, female hotshots signed up for the same reasons as men. Sherry
Reid, one of the first females on a hotshot crew, described her attraction to
the job:
[W]hen I got into fire I realized that I loved to see the human body,
my body, pushed to extremes.... I liked challenging myself against
men and what they could do. You could call that macho if you want. I
chewed tobacco. I arm-wrestled. I did the whole nine yards. I loved it. I
loved the chainsaw, the dirt, the exhaustion, the traveling, the risk, the
adrenaline .... It was the best time of my life. 66
Female hotshots adopted many male hotshot habits in order to prove that
they were equally as tough as their male crewmates, yet this over-confident
attitude among all hotshots translated into trouble and even tragedy.
As the Forest Service redoubled its aggressive suppression efforts after
World War II, hotshot crews became more efficient and more numerous
than before the conflict. Stretched to the limits to protect homes and natural resources and driven by their can-do attitude, they suffered a number of
fatalities in the second half of the twentieth century. A review of the major
disasters that involved hotshots illuminates the relationship between the
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HOTSHOT DANA MCCORKLE GETS SOME CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FROM
HELICOPTER WATER DROP

(Photograph courtesy Mike McMillan, www.spitfireimages.com)
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IHC program and national policy, while also shedding light on IHC work
culture.
In 1956 the first post-war disaster struck an organized hand crew on the
Inaja Fire in California. 67 Eleven firefighters died while trying to escape a
sudden blowup on a hillside. The fatalities spurred the Forest Service into
action. U.S. Forest Service chief Richard McArdle appointed a task force to
study the ways in which the agency could strengthen its efforts to prevent
firefighter fatalities. The task force examined everything from fire behavior
to protective clothing. It recommended additional training for fire-crew
supervisors and considered national training courses and a fire research/
training center. 68 In 1958 the agency instituted the "10 Standard Firefighting
Orders" and ''18 Watch Out Situations." Standard order number 10 read,
"Fight fire aggressively but provide for safety first."69 When Chief McArdle
announced the ten standard orders, he stated, "Training is not complete
until the trainee is convinced that the safest, most effective way to fight
forest fires is to understand the enemy and to attack it aggressively."70 Despite this new training, the

10 AM

Policy remained the modus operandi of

the Forest Service in the 1950s.
Less than ten years later, the Forest Service failed to examine or address
hotshot culture after a disaster fire in 1966. Much like the Inaja Fire a decade earlier, another crew became trapped on a hillside in California's Angeles National Forest and suffered major casualties. After one hotshot crew
refused to work on the hillside, the beret-wearing El Cariso Hotshots, possibly compelled by "the 'can-do' attitude, [and] a sense of ability and invincibility," accepted the assignment and placed themselves in the dangerous
situation. An undetected spot fire below the crew unexpectedly raced up
the hillside in less than a minute, killing twelve crewmembers. Again, the
Forest Service formed a task force to study the Loop Fire and reassess basic
firefighting training. The investigation placed a new emphasis on the evaluation of fuels and their affect on fire behavior. In addition the task force
developed rules against downhill fireline construction, and the use of
handheld radios for crew communication became standard. The Fire Policy
and Procedure Review Committee meeting in February 1967 in Washington, D.C., sustained the 10 AM Policy and responded to the Loop Fire by
advocating for national training standards and a central training center. In
1967 the Forest Service established the National Fire Training Center at
Marana, Arizona. 7!
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A number of fatal fires, one of which involved a hotshot crew, marred
fire suppression efforts in the 1970s. In 1976 three hotshots died on the Battlement Creek Fire in Colorado, when a fire intentionally started to reduce
fuels between the firefighters and the main blaze escaped the fireline, trapping four men. n As the fire advanced on both flanks, the four hotshots'
unquestioning acceptance of their fire assignment trapped them in a shallow handline to wait for the approaching fire front. Only one of the four
survived. As a result of these casualties, the Forest Service mandated that all
employees carry fire shelters while engaged in fireline activities. 73 The investigation failed to question the aggressive policy and tactics that placed
the firefighters in that precarious position. Still, fire management reaffirmed
the 10 AM Policy.74
Then, in 1977, the USFS rescinded the 10 AM Policy, but hotshot work
culture, inculcated in the elite crews at every level, continued to inform the
actions on the fireline. Confidence in their physical abilities, combined
with a mission to aggressively fight fires, created a character flaw in the
hotshot crews' work culture. Egos and unit pride still influenced hotshots to
push themselves beyond what they could safely accomplish. This confidence, considered a beneficial trait as early as the 1930S, later proved detrimental after two fire disasters in the 1990S. The investigation report of the
Dude Fire Incident, which killed six firefighters, cautioned: "Do not let
your ego or other people's high expectations of your capabilities influence
you to accept assignments with high levels of risk. Specialized fire resources
such as helitack crews, hotshot crews, and smoke jumpers are especially susceptible to this pressure."75
Despite their recognition within the wildland firefighting world, few
members of the public had ever heard of the thirteen hundred firefighters
who called themselves hotshots until 6 July 199+ On that day, fourteen
wildland firefighters lost their lives in a single incident on Storm King
Mountain near Glenwood Springs, Colorado. One hotshot crew, sixteen
smokejumpers, and a collection of regular Forest Service, BLM, and Park
Service employees fought to contain a blaze before it crept down toward
the resort community. The firefighters worked furiously and, in the process,
ignored many of their safety guidelines. Meanwhile, their command structure crumbled, and warnings about a storm system, which could create winds
associated with extreme fire behavior, moving into the area never reached
the firefighters. At approximately four o'clock in the afternoon, with half
the firefighters digging a fireline down a steep, gambel oak-covered hillside,
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the fire jumped the control line and exploded to engulf the entire west
drainage and all those working in a wall offlame. The fourteen who died on
the South Canyon Fire included nine members (four of them female) of
the Prineville Hotshots, three smoke jumpers, and two helitack personnel.76
The BLM director and the Forest Service chief ordered their respective
agencies to produce an interagency report within forty-five days of the tragedy. The South Canyon Fire Investigation Team noted the complete breakdown in the chain of command but concluded that the can-do attihlde of the
firefighters involved in the incident led to the violation of eight of the ten
Standard Fire Orders and thirteen of the eighteen Watch Out Situations.??
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) cited the Forest Service and BLM for not enforcing their own safety guidelines. One surviving smoke jumper observed the tension between rules and expectations:
So, we often violate the "Standard Orders" to push the envelope when
our judgement [sic] and experience tell us that we can. That
willingness is calculated. We do it to protect lives and conserve
resources to effectively complete our task-to put out forest fires.
Some call this a "can-do" attitude. Others term it over zealousness.
Nonetheless, the attitude prevails among hotshots and smokejumpers.78
By the 199os, hotshots typically bent and broke some of the safety guidelines
to achieve their agency's suppression goals. Fire managers were aware of
this practice and acknowledged that even though hotshots pushed safety
regulation boundaries, the difference between a routine fire and tragedy
was often minor. 79
Unfortunately, the South Canyon Fire was not a minor tragedy. One
textbook, Introduction to Wildland Fire (1996), described South Canyon as
a "sickening synopsis of decades of disaster fires."8o The incident came in
the middle of a devastating fire year. Despite aggressive suppression efforts
in 1994, four million acres burned, 965 million dollars were spent in overbudget costs, and thirty-four firefighters lost their lives. The Forest Service
and other federal agencies finally conceded that something was terribly wrong
with fire policy. A smokejumper who survived the South Canyon Fire succinctly stated: "There wasn't anything on that hill worth killing anybody
over. Nobody's life is worth a measly patch ofbrush."8!
For the first time in sixty years, a disaster that involved hotshots precipitated a change in fire suppression policy. The secretaries ofthe interior and
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agriculture chartered the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy and
Program Review in 1994. Several federal agencies, including the Forest Service, conducted a comprehensive review because "[in 1994] thirty-four
firefighters died, fourteen of them on the South Canyon Fire in Colorado."82
The South Canyon Fire was particularly shocking because it took the lives
of nine members of the wildland firefighting's elite. As a result of the review,
the safety of firefighters assigned to an incident became the number one priority. In addition the changes mandated annual refresher training courses, an
external review of firefighting culture, and the study of decision-making
dynamics in high-risk environments. 8)Finally, the report challenged the current fire-suppression policy by declaring that agencies and the public needed
to recognize that not all wildland fires could or should be suppressed. 84
Hotshot crews, now totaling ninety, continue to shoulder the responsibility of suppressing large fires. 85 With the public's escalating pressure to
protect its urban-interface homes, the specialized skills of the hotshots remain in high demand. In light of subsequent tragedies after the South Canyon Fire, however, fire management has adopted the tenet, "Firefighter
safety comes first on every fire, every time."86 Still, the can-do attitude and
work culture is hard to give up. Recently two Montana hotshot superintendents publicly complained about the perceived changes in crew culture:
Are the hotshot crews of the 90S the proud, professional, "no-slack"
performers of history or something else? ... Fellow hotshot crews are
increasingly having to deal with crews that cannot or will not do the
job! Instances of crews "playing the safety card" to get out of work,
whining and demanding special treatment, leaving going incidents
when out of days, disciplinary problems and lack of performance are
all common complai~ts among [fire management] teams and within
the hotshot community.S?
Although the public's perception of the Forest Service's ability, obligation,
and eagerness to suppress all wildland fires may not change, the agency and
the hotshots recognize that there are definite limitations to their fire suppression mission. Their tempered aggressiveness is reflected in today's National Interagency Hotshot Crew Steering Committee's official motto:
"Safety, Teamwork, Professionalism."88
The South Canyon Fire disaster of 1994, while triggering a major review
of fire management policy, also brought criticism of the rigid and aggressive
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work culture of the hotshots. The hotshot crew's attitude of invulnerability
significantly contributed to the loss of life. A month after South Canyon,
former hotshot superintendent Gleason warned, "Firefighters must maintain a constant vigilance against casualness, a principle element in an exaggerated 'can-do' attitude." After forty years, the 10 AM Policy was abandoned
because researchers questioned the long-term forest health and economic
benefits of the policy. Likewise, hotshot crews recognized the flaws embedded in their work culture and opted to make safety their main priority. "It's
the gung-ho attitude we're trying to corral a little bit," said a fire manager in
2002.

"Sometimes there's nothing you can do about [a fire], so you might as

well sit back and have a Snickers and a Coke."89 By adopting a mindset that
goes against the grain of the hotshot's ethos, crews demonstrate that saving
lives now takes precedence over meeting the public's demands, fulfilling
national policies, and maintaining reputations.
Wildland fire is an ever-increasing threat in the West. The intensity and
frequency of fires crescendo each year. 90 As more and more people move
into formerly rural areas, the demand for fire suppression and protection
increases each year. 9! Examining the work culture and origins of the elite
firefighters provides a better understanding of the changing nature of federal fire policy and its relationship with the men and women who implement that policy.
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